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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director for Operations DATE: 30 April 1952

FROM : Chief, [REDACTED] 25X1A8a

SUBJECT: SE-26, Draft Dated 16 April 1952: The Soviet Notes on German Unity as a Possible Indication of a More "Conciliatory" Soviet Policy.

1. Referenced Estimate concludes that the Soviet notes on German unity represent only an effort to turn the delicate balance of European public opinion against the European Defense Community and Western rearmament by initiating protracted discussion without any real willingness to risk the consequences. It is of interest to note that in respect to entertaining the possibility of free elections, this conclusion was until about 21 April at variance with the apparent indications of Communist propaganda publicizing the notes, which was of such a nature as to be a suitable preparation of its various audiences for a revision of Soviet policy and for the possibility of a neutralized independent Germany. The pertinent elements in this propaganda pattern are the following.

2. Propaganda to Western Europe.

a. The chief element in Moscow's propaganda to Western European audiences on German topics had in the past been the threat which German remilitarization poses to its former victims. In the past two years this subject had never been slighted by Moscow broadcasts for more than two consecutive weeks. After the Soviet note of March 10, however, instead of increasing its pressure on this Western sore spot, Moscow had completely avoided the remilitarization issue and had kept all comment on Germany to non-German audiences at an unusually low volume.

b. Moscow broadcasts, usually little differentiated in approach to individual audiences, made an unprecedented attempt to justify a united Germany to French, British, Dutch and Italian audiences by assuring them individually and on diverse and almost contradictory grounds that they would not be threatened by a neutral and independent German state.

3. Propaganda to Germany.

a. In the past, Communist broadcasts have largely avoided discussion of the Oder-Neisse line with German audiences. At this time, however, instead of playing down this unpleasant aspect of the Soviet terms for unification, East German broadcasts undertook a marked psychological liability in a concerted and intense campaign to justify the boundary to the German people.

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4. Propaganda to Soviet and Satellite Audiences.

a. For the first time, there was a sustained campaign to reconcile the Russian people to German unity by assuring them that a unified and armed Germany would not constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. This propaganda recalled the neutral Germany of Rapallo, dismissed the fear of revanche, assured the Russians that the Germans are a peaceful people, and supported a unified armed Germany as the only alternative to the threat of a West German army under NATO. A similar effort was made to convince the Satellite people that the Germans "have changed." The Prague radio justified the proposed Nazi amnesty on the grounds that "the Germans of today are different from those who joined the Nazi party."

5. General Characteristics.

a. This propaganda on Germany indicated unusual effort in that it

(1) was comparatively mild and free from invective, on occasion even minimizing Western Soviet differences,

(2) was comparatively argumentative and closely reasoned rather than bombastic, and

(3) tailored its appeal to individual audiences to an unprecedented degree.

b. The type of regime pictured by implication in propaganda supporting a neutralized Germany was one freed from American influence but including nationalist parties like the SPD, an anti-imperialist and anti-fascist but not necessarily "democratic" government.

6. During the week April 21 - 27, however, there has been a change in some aspects of this propaganda pattern. There has been increased attention to German remilitarization in the West European beams and an intensified campaign against the contractual agreement and the EDC in the German beam. Reassurance propaganda in the Home Service has all but dropped out.

25X1A8a 7. [REDACTED] analysts will welcome an opportunity to present further evidence and elaboration if it is desired.

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